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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE PROMISE TO ARBITRATE
HARRY H. WELLINGTON
UNE 20, 1960 was an important day in the history of labor and
the law. On that day the Supreme Court handed down three in-
terrelated decisions clarifying the role of the judiciary in labor arbi-
tration.1 Written opinions were filed indicating that, where a collective
bargaining agreement contains a general promise to arbitrate future
disputes, a court is to order arbitration or enforce an arbitration award
without serious inquiry into whether the parties agreed to submit the
particular dispute to an arbitrator.2 These opinions are likely to have
significant impact on the institution of labor arbitration.
The proper role of courts in the arbitration process is an old and
much rehearsed issue. An examination of labor arbitration cases in
the courts would reveal that lower courts, by and large, have taken a
quite different approach from this one espoused by the Supreme
Court.3 Careful and full inquiry into whether a dispute is within the
ambit of a general promise to arbitrate has been the judicial standard.4
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1. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 US. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 US. 574 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
2. Mr. Justice Douglas wrote the opinion of the Court in each of the three
cases. Mr. Justice Brennan wrote a concurring opinion in American and Warrior. Only
Mr. Justice Whittaker was in dissent, and he only in Warrior and Enterprise. In
both cases he articulated his reasons for dissenting.
3. See, e.g., Local 201, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 262
F.2d 265 (1st Cir. 1959); Lodge 12, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Cameron Iron Works,
Inc., 257 F.2d 467 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958).
4. "[W]hen one of the parties needs the aid of a court, and asks the court for a
decree ordering specific performance of a contract to arbitrate, we think that the
court, before rendering such a decree, has the inescapable obligation to determine as
a preliminary matter that the defendant has contracted to refer such issue to arbitra-
tion, and has broken this promise." Local 149, Am. Fed'n of Technical Eng'rs v.
General Elec. Co., 250 F.2d 922, 927 (Ist Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 938
(1958). At a purely verbal level the Supreme Court might be able to endorse this
statement by the court of appeals. In Warrior, the Court said:
It is clear that under both the agreement in this case and that involved in
American Manufacturing Co .... the question of arbitrability is for the
courts to decide .... Where the assertion by the claimant is that the parties
excluded from court determination not merely the decision of the merits
of the grievance but also the question of its arbitrability, vesting power to
make both decisions in the arbitrator, the claimant must bear the burden
of a dear demonstration of that purpose.
363 U.S. at 583 n.7. By arbitrability the Court means whether "the defendant has
contracted to refer [a dispute] to arbitration, and has broken this promise." The
Supreme Court, however, would deide this question on the basis of a powerful
presumption in favor of arbitration. The court of appeals-and most courLs-would
have deided this question as it would any question of contract interpretation. This
is what that court did in the Local 149 case. There can be no doubt that an application
of the Supreme Court's approach there would have resulted in a different holding.
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A similar examination of the law journals would show, on the other
hand, that the Supreme Court has moved the law a long way in the
general direction advocated by many close students of labor relations.'
In two of the Supreme Court cases, a union requested a district
court to compel an employer to submit a dispute to arbitration. The
employer insisted that he had never promised to do so.0 In the third
case, a union sought court assistance in forcing an employer to obey
an arbitrator's award. The employer's position was that the arbi-
trator had exceeded his power. 7 As these cases show, judicial inter-
vention in arbitration can come either prior or subsequent to an
arbitrator's award. What the Court did is best evaluated by consid-
ering the two types of intervention separately.8
JUDICIAL INTERVENTION PRIOR To ARBITRATION
I
Consider as a model for the problem of judicial intervention prior to
arbitration the case of United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navi-
gation Co. 9 This was one of the three cases with which the Supreme
Court was concerned, and it is the case in which the Court produced
its major opinion. The underlying dispute was over Warrior's sub-
contracting to other employers the maintenance work on its barges.
5. See, e.g., Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30 Rocky
Mt. L. Rev. 247 (1958); Summers, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration or Alice
Through the Looking Glass, 2 Buffalo L. Rev. 1 (1952).
6. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). In the American Mfg. case,
the employer also raised other defenses. The case involved the reinstatement of an
injured employee who had received compensation benefits. The employee's physician
had expressed the opinion that the employee was 25% "permanently partially disabled."
In resisting arbitration, the employer argued that this estopped the employee, and also
that he was not physically able to do the work.
In the lower courts the employer prevailed, the court of appeals asserting that
the employee's claim was "a frivolous, patently baseless one, not subject to arbitration
under the collective bargaining agreement." United Steelworkers v. American Mfg.
Co., 264 F.2d 624, 628 (6th Cir. 1959). The Supreme Court addressed itself to this.
"[T]he agreement is to submit all grievances to arbitration, not merely those that
a court may deem to be meritorious." 363 U.S. at 567. In connection with this
problem, compare Matter of Arbitration between International Ass'n of Machinists
and Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 271 App. Div. 917, 67 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1st Dep't) (mom.),
aff'd mer., 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E.2d 464 (1947), with New Bedford Defense Prod.
Div. v. Local 1113, UAW, 258 F.2d 522 (1st Cir. 1958).
7. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
8. For earlier evaluations of these three cases see Hays, The Supreme Court and
Labor Law, October Term, 1959, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 901, 919-34 (1960); Meltzer, The
Supreme Court, Arbitrability and Collective Bargaining, 28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 464 (1961);
Note, "Arbitrability" of Labor Disputes, 47 Va. L. Rev. 1182 (1961).
9. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
4
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This subcontracting allegedly precipitated the layoff of several Warrior
employees who were represented by the Steelworkers Union. The
union charged that the subcontracting was a violation of its collective
bargaining agreement with Warrior. It asserted that the layoffs result-
ing from the subcontracting were tantamount to a partial lockout, an
employer weapon specifically prohibited by the agreement.
The parties were unable to resolve this dispute through negoti-
ation, and when Warrior declined to arbitrate the union filed a bill
in equity.1" Once again the union charged that Warrier had broken
the bargaining agreement, this time claiming a violation of the arbi-
tration clause. The clause provided:
Should differences arise between the Company and the Union or
its members employed by the Company as to the meaning and appli-
cation of the provisions of this Agreement, or should any local trouble
of any kind arise, there shall be no suspension of work on account of
such differences but an earnest effort shall be made to settle such
differences immediately in the following manner:
[I]f agreement [by negotiation channeled through the
grievance procedure] has not been reached the matter shall be referred
to an impartial umpire for decision."
The Steelworkers wanted the court to compel arbitration of the
underlying dispute involving the subcontracting, by ordering specific
performance of the promise to arbitrate.
Warrior resisted such an order. It insisted that the arbitration
promise did not extend to a dispute over subcontracting, since sub-
contracting was strictly a management function. The provision of the
bargaining agreement relied on by the union also provided that
"'matters which are strictly a function of management shall not be
subject to arbitration . .. ., Thus was the issue joined. It is
important to observe that here, as is generally the case, the question
which the court was invited to decide as a preliminary matter was
clearly related to the question the arbitrator would have to decide
10. The suit was brought in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Alabama under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 StaL
156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958), which provides: "Suits for violation of contracts
between an employer and a labor organization . . . may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties." In Textile
Workers v. Lincoln ills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), § 301 was held to empower a district
court to grant-as a matter of federal law--specific performance of the promLe to
arbitrate. Lincoln Mills left open the question decided in Warrior, namely, how a
court is to go about deiding whether a promise to arbitrate has been broken.
11. 363 U.S. at 576.
12. Ibid.
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if allowed to reach the merits. Central to whether Warrior had
promised to arbitrate a dispute over subcontracting was the question
whether subcontracting is in fact "strictly a function of management."
Central to whether Warrior had broken its promise when it sub-
contracted work was again the question whether subcontracting is
"strictly a function of management."'1
A lawyer who is not a specialist in labor relations would prob-
ably conclude that a judge faced with a case of this nature should
decide it as he would any contract question. Summoning all of the
skills that training and experience have given him, the judge should
carefully consider all information properly presented to him that
bears upon the meaning of the contract. Only then would it be
legitimate for him to place the weight of government behind the
claim of the union or the employer. But this approach has difficulties
which are rooted in the nature of a collective bargaining agreement
and in the relationship between law and the collective bargaining
process.
The figure of speech likening a collective bargaining agreement
to a broad regulatory statute is familiar. There is indeed much sim-
ilarity between the two; there are also differences. Some of the simil-
arities and some of the differences are worth noting. 4 They help
explain why the question in Warrior should not be approached in
the way the nonspecialist lawyer would assume proper.
First, broad regulatory statutes and collective bargaining agree-
ments frequently cover a large variety of technical and specialized
problems. Nevertheless, they are usually drafted in purposefully
vague terms. Not only must the language be general enough to
encompass a variety of unforeseen and unforeseeable events, but it
must also fail to resolve some present controversies. For the price
of present resolution may be no legislation on the one hand, and
a prolonged strike on the other. Second, and closely related, neither
statute nor agreement necessarily exhausts the field it regulates. The
common law of the jurisdiction, whether that jurisdiction be govern-
ment or industrial enterprise, still has a direct role to play; although
after the enactment of the statute or the formation of the agreement
the common law itself must frequently be modified. Third, and largely
as a consequence of the first two points, a broad regulatory statute
not only must be interpreted in terms of its specific purpose, but
13. On this question of the overlap between the merits and the scope of the
promise to arbitrate, see generally Wellington, Judge Magruder and the Labor
Contract, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1268, 1281-1300 (1959).
14. See, e.g., Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 Harv.
L. Rev. 999 (1955); Summers, supra note 5, at 13-20.
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it must also be fitted into the general body of law and interpreted in
a fashion harmonious with the received traditions and principles
of that body of law. So too a collective bargaining agreement. The
traditions and principles relevant to the interpretation of a bargaining
agreement, however, derive in large part from the history of the
particular enterprise covered by the agreement.
Specialized agencies are frequently created by broad regulatory
statutes. The characteristics of such statutes, noted above, explain
in part the differentiation of function between these agencies and
the courts. Often the agency stands between the statute and the
court, and often this is a wise interposition. A court may not be able
to do as good a job, in the first instance, as a specialized tribunal."
Collective bargaining agreements frequently provide for arbitra-
tion. The characteristics of such agreements, noted above, suggest
that in at least one area the differentiation of function between
arbitrator and court might appropriately resemble that between
judiciary and specialized agency. Perhaps the arbitrator should stand
between the agreement and the courts.' Indeed, there is a strong
reason not present in the agency-court situation for placing the
arbitrator in this front line position. Courts are experts in relating
a specific statute to a general body of law. They have, however, no
expertise in relating a collective bargaining agreement to the differing
laws of differing enterprises.
Thus, when judges, in deciding whether to order arbitration,
marshal their resources and approach the question before them as
they would any other question of contract interpretation, the con-
sequences are likely to be unhappy, both for the institution of col-
lective bargaining and for the courts themselves. Chances are good
that the judiciary will make bad law. This is the lesson of experience
as well as the insight of analysis. It is, for example, the history of
labor arbitration in the State of New York." Moreover, it is all too
probable that courts will tend to read collective bargaining agree-
ments as if they were all the same. The judicial process in a busy
world can hardly escape this. But the consequences are unhappy.
15. This is of course true of many aspects of labor law. See San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). See generally Wellington, Labor
and the Federal System, 26 U. Chi. L. Rev. 542 (1959).
16. "Except where the parties have agreed with explicitness beyond plausible
controversy that a subject shall not be arbitrated, a court will incline to require
the parties to a collective bargaining agreement with arbitration provisions to take
their dispute to the arbitrator for his exercise of primary jurisdiction." Matter of
Jacobson, 161 F. Supp. 222, 226 (D. Mass.), rev'd sub noa. Boston Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Insurance Agents' Union, 258 F.2d 516 (1st Cir. 1958).
17. The story is told in Summers, supra note 5, at 1.
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Collective bargaining works as well as it does because it is adaptable
to the diverse needs of enterprises.
All of this leads one to the same conclusion reached by the
Supreme Court:
An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied
unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause
is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.
Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.
In the absence of any express provision excluding a particular
grievance from arbitration, we think only the most forceful evidence
of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail, particu-
larly where, as here, the exclusion clause is vague and the arbitration
clause quite broad. Since any attempt by a court to infer such a purpose
necessarily comprehends the merits, the court should view with suspicion
an attempt to persuade it to become entangled in the construction of the
substantive provisions of a labor agreement, even through the back
door of interpreting the arbitration clause, when the alternative is to
utilize the services of an arbitrator.18
II
The question remains whether this conclusion really constitutes
an abandonment of the fundamental theory of judicial intervention
in a pre-arbitration case. I take that theory to be that when a court
orders arbitration it is enforcing a consensual obligation; it is grant-
ing specific performance of a contract.
Mr. Justice Whittaker, in dissent, seems to suggest that the
Court has departed from this principle, and he seems surprised by the
departure. 9 But I would suggest that one can be surprised only if
one has too limited a view of the law of contract. What the court has
done, in effect, is erect a canon of construction that strongly favors
arbitration. This canon rests upon public policy: the relative com-
petence of court and arbitrator, and the relation of this to the
institution of collective bargaining and the integrity of the judicial
process. This public policy is unrelated, in any direct way at least,
to the intention of the parties. But surely there are few who would
maintain that this is a unique approach to contracts.2" Today, there
can be no question that "not everything is contractual in a con-
tract.""
18. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-85,
(1960).
19. Id. at 585.
20. See, e.g., 3A Corbin, Contracts §§ 653-86 (rev. ed. 1960).
21. Durkhein, quoted in Kessler & Sharp, Cases on Contracts 80 (1953).
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While this is not a unique approach, it is an approach for which
a price must be paid. Labor arbitration plainly has become less
voluntary than it was. But some cost is inevitable if there is to be
judicial intervention at the pre-arbitration stage. In my judgment,
the Supreme Court's method of judicial intervention is the least ex-
pensive in terms of the cost to the institutions involved. It saves
courts from the disrepute that inevitably follows the assumption of
tasks that cannot be performed well; and it places most of the
initial responsibility for decision on the arbitrator who, though im-
perfect, is the more qualified interpreter of the collective bargaining
agreement 22
JUDICIAL INTERVENTION AFTER ARBITRATION
I
Suppose that in a case like Warrior, an arbitrator were to decide
that subcontracting was not strictly a "function of management,"
and that the employer had indeed violated the collective bargaining
agreement when he subcontracted maintenance work to other em-
ployers. Should the employer now be able to get serious judicial
review of whether he had ever promised to arbitrate a dispute over
subcontracting? The Supreme Court, it would appear, suggests a
negative answer to this question.
In the post-arbitration case decided by the Court, United Steel-
workers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,2 the question was not
raised directly. The employer's principal contention was that the
arbitrator had acted without power in ordering reinstatement of em-
ployees after the collective bargaining agreement had expired. The
Court's reasoning, however, leads one to conclude that after an
award, judicial examination of the scope of the promise to arbitrate
often is to be as limited as it is in a suit to compel arbitration. While
noting that "an arbitrator is confined to interpretation and applica-
tion of the collective bargaining agreement,"24 and that "his award
is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the ... agree-
ment, 2 5 the majority asserts:
The refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is
the proper approach to arbitration under collective bargaining agree-
22. In an action for damages for breach of a collective bargaining agreement, a court
may have to assume initial-indeed sole-responsibility for decision. And if the action
is for breach of an implied no-strike clause, the question for the court may be
whether the grievance that precipitated the strike was an arbitrable dispute. See
Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.. 95 (1962).
23. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
24. Id. at 597.
25. Ibid.
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ments. The federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration
would be undermined if courts had the final say on the merits of the
awards. As we stated in United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co. .... the arbitrators under these collective agree-
ments are indispensable agencies in a continuous collective bargaining
process. They sit to settle disputes at the plant level-disputes that
require for their solution knowledge of the custom and practices of a
particular factory or of a particular industry as reflected in particular
agreements.
When an arbitrator is commissioned to interpret and apply the
collective bargaining agreement, he is to bring his informed judgment
to bear in order to reach a fair solution of a problem. 20
Of course, as the Court recognized in Warrior, the central issue
involved in a decision on the merits of the underlying dispute and
the central issue involved in a decision on the scope of the arbitration
promise usually are the same.27 In Warrior that issue was whether
subcontracting is "strictly a function of management." One would
suppose, therefore, that the spirit of the Enterprise case would pre-
clude a court from making too close an examination of whether sub-
contracting was "strictly a function of management," no matter how
the issue was raised in a suit to enforce an award.
The nagging question posed by this conclusion is whether such
an allocation of function between arbitrator and court-a wise al-
location at the pre-arbitration stage-makes sense in a post-arbitra-
tion proceeding. The Court's explanation is not wholly satisfactory.
It rests principally upon the same argument advanced for judicial
abnegation in a pre-arbitration suit; namely, the relatively greater
competence of the arbitrator." But surely this argument loses force
after an arbitrator has brought his informed judgment to bear upon
the problem. With that judgment available to it, the court, I should
think, is in a vastly improved position to undertake a meaningful
review. The analogy to administrative law again is obvious. Indeed,
the majority at one point tells us that: "When the arbitrator's words
manifest an infidelity to . . . [his obligation to make an award that
'draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement,'] courts
have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award." 21 The Court's
opinion goes on to say, however, that "arbitrators have no obligation
to the court to give their reasons for an award. To require opinions
free of ambiguity may lead arbitrators to play it safe by writing
no supporting opinions. This would be undesirable for a well-reasoned
26. Id. at 596-97.
27. 363 U.S. at 584-85.
28. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
29. 363 U.S. at 597.
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opinion tends to engender confidence in the integrity of the process
and aids in clarifying the underlying agreement.""0
It is not clear why a court could not insist that an arbitrator
produce an unambiguous and reasoned opinion. True, no such re-
quirement existed prior to Warrior; but Warrior changed the re-
lationship between court and arbitrator in an effort to create a more
viable system of labor arbitration. Surely Warrior did not exhaust
the Court's creative power. With or without a well-reasoned arbitra-
tor's opinion, the question still must be whether it is wise policy for
a court to place the weight of government behind an award without
giving serious attention to the objecting party's claim that it had
never promised to submit the dispute to arbitration in the first
place. The factors that might lead one towards an affirmative answer
to this question are perhaps best exposed by contrasting the judicial
process with arbitration.
II
The declaration of law through reasoned elaboration of rules
and principles is perhaps the hallmark of the judicial process. These
rules and principles embody experience which, of course, must be
constantly re-evaluated by all law-declaring institutions, particularly
the courts themselves. Nevertheless, judicial law declaration relies
substantially less on the exercise of discretion by the decision maker
than does law declaration by institutions which, as a result of tradition
and structure, are not called upon to act in a consistent fashion or
to justify their actions in reasoned opinions. The executive and legis-
lative branches of government are plainly institutions of this latter
stripe. Administrative tribunals partake of some of the same charac-
teristics in their rule-making activities. Arbitration tribunals, how-
ever, particularly in the labor field, are much harder to classify in
terms of the degree to which the decision maker may properly use
discretion.
We are told by the majority in the Enterprise case, on the one
hand, that the arbitrator "does not sit to dispense his own brand of
industrial justice."'" His power, Mr. Justice Whittaker assumes in
dissent, is strictly limited by contract; his task, much the same as
that of the judge 2 On the other hand, the majority tells us-this
time in the Warrior case-that
the labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties' confidence
30. Id. at 598. (Footnote omitted.)
31. Id. at 597.
32. "Until today, I had understood it to be the unquestioned law, as this Court
has consistently held, that arbitrators are private judges chosen by the parties to
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in his knowledge of the common law of the shop and their trust in his
personal judgment to bring to bear considerations which are not
expressed in the contract as criteria for judgment. The parties expect
that his judgment of a particular grievance will reflect not only what
the contract says but, insofar as the collective bargaining agreement
permits, such factors as the effect upon productivity of a particular
result, its consequence to the morale of the shop, his judgment whether
tensions will be heightened or diminished. For the parties' objective
in using the arbitration process is primarily to further their common goal
of uninterrupted production under the agreement, to make the agree-
ment serve their specialized needs.33
One private dispute settlement tribunal, established by the In-
ternational Brotherhood of. Electrical Workers and the National
Electrical Contractors Association, announced the difference be-
tween the arbitration and judicial processes in the following terms:
The Council differs from so-called arbitration boards in that it
professes to be a court of justice and not merely a court of arbitration.
It proceeds on the theory that arbitration involves compromise, which
seems to mean in some minds adding up the claims of both sides of a
dispute and dividing the sum by two; while judicial settlement involves
the application of definite and certain principles without any accommo-
dation between the parties.3 4
From a cluster of factors that might account for the divergent
views about the role of discretion in arbitration, two, to my mind,
are particularly compelling. First, insufficient study has been devoted
to the role of discretion in labor arbitration. Accordingly, one can be
free and easy with one's speculations. Second, there is no unitary
system of labor arbitration. The nature of arbitration under any
collective bargaining agreement depends upon how several factors
interact. What, for example, does the collective agreement say?
What do the parties want? What does the arbitrator conceive to be
the needs of the parties, and how does he perceive his role and the
restraints imposed upon him?
Different combinations of answers to these questions result in
arbitrations that differ markedly as to the place of discretion in the
process. To the extent, however, that the parties themselves control
the scope of the arbitrator's discretion, this difference may be de-
decide particular matters specifically submitted; that the contract under which
matters are submitted to arbitrators is at once the source and limit of their authority
and power .... " United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 374,
585-86 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
33. Id. at 582.
34. Local 28, Intl Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Maryland Chapter, Natl Elec.
Contractors Ass'n, 194 F. Supp. 494, 497 (D. Md. 1961).
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sirable. Indeed it may be an important reason for the success of
arbitration in labor relations.
Surely there is wisdom in the attitude which places a high value
upon privately formulated regulation, be it substantive or procedural,
primary or remedial. The dominance of this attitude in American
law is reflected, for example, in our federal labor policy. By and
large, labor laws do not attempt to control directly; they rely rather
upon private formulation of primary, substantive obligations (for
example, terms and conditions of employment).3r Of course, this is
everywhere characteristic of our society. The private contract may
not have the importance it once had, but still it is at or very close
to the center of legal relationships.
The private settlement or compromise agreement, on the reme-
dial level, is a pervasive and legally encouraged way of resolving
disputes. In labor relations it has become highly systematized. Most
collective bargaining agreements provide multi-step grievance pro-
cedures, and it is fair to say that without such procedures collective
bargaining agreements could not be successfully administered.
The whole movement towards arbitration as a means of dispute
settlement stems in part from an acceptance of the proposition that
it is a wise policy to encourage regulation that is formulated by the
subjects of the regulation. In arbitration the parties draft the sub-
mission agreement and pick the decision maker. These two factors
probably go a long way in shaping the results of the arbitration. The
latter factor is perhaps of particular importance where the submission
agreement is drafted prior to any dispute and is general enough in
its terms to cover the vast range of controversy that may arise
during the contract time. Submission agreements in collective bar-
gaining contracts are of this type. Therefore the philosophy of the
35. Nothing in this bill allows the Federal Government or any agency to
fix wages, to regulate rates of pay, to limit hours of work, or to effect or
govern any working conditions in any establishment or place of employ-
ment. .... There is nothing in this bill that compels any employer to make
any agreement about wages, hours of employment, or working conditions
with his employees .... The bill indicates the method and manner in which
employees may organize, the method and manner of selecting their representa-
tives or spokesmen, and leads them to the office door of their employer with
the legal authority to negotiate for their fellow employees. The bill does
not go beyond the office door. It leaves the discussion between the employer
and the employee, and the agreements which they may or may not make,
voluntary and with that sacredness and solemnity to a voluntary agreement
with which both parties to an agreement should be enshrouded.
79 Cong. Rec. 7659 (1935). This famous statement by Senator Wahh, then chairman
of the Committee on Education and Labor, about the Wagner Act, overdid it a bit.
The Government's role was more than the Senator made out, and has become a
good deal more since Taft-Hartley. Nevertheless, the Senator did express what has
remained the basic mood of our federal labor policy.
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arbitrator may be as important as any factor in predicting the ex-
tent to which discretion will shape the award. And this in turn may
be an important consideration of the parties when they come to
choose their arbitrator.
To put this another, and perhaps more direct way, labor arbitra-
tion may not always be a dispute settlement technique that relies
solely on pre-existing standards and norms found in a collective bar-
gaining agreement and in the common law of an enterprise. Some-
times arbitration may be a technique that relies upon considerations
of expediency for preserving industrial peace and keeping everyone
as happy as possible. This may mean that the arbitrator will give less
than full attention to the terms of the agreement or the common law
of the enterprise. This may be what the parties expect when they
choose their arbitrator. But how can a court tell on review?
Thus, the Supreme Court's apparent instructions to the lower
courts, not to review seriously the scope of the promise to arbitrate
after an award has been made, may reflect the Court's unwillingness
to have the judiciary tamper with what the Court takes to be a satis-
factory, and frequently highly discretionary, process. 30
While one may understand this motivation, and in part sym-
pathize with it, I do not think that what the Court seems to be doing
can be approved. The Supreme Court has not taken the judiciary
out of arbitration. It has not said that the courts will not interfere.
It has announced that the entire weight of government is almost al-
ways to be placed on one side of a controversy. This, it seems, is to
be done on the basis of the Supreme Court's general faith in arbitra-
tion. It is to be done by a court often without any serious attention
to the particular controversy before it.
Should courts be used this way? The major function of courts
in the labor arbitration area no longer is to resolve particular disputes
through the application of general and reasoned principles. It is, rather,
blindly to approve and make official the actions of private decision-
makers whose authority to decide is frequently itself the issue in
dispute.
Consider again what the Court has done. Apparently out of
the belief that arbitration works well, that arbitrators rely heavily
in some cases on prudential considerations, and further that some-
times this is what the parties want, the Court has made it possible
for arbitrators to exercise enormous discretion without regard to the
36. It is again important to remember that, in most cases, serious review of
the scope of the promise to arbitrate is tantamount to serious review of at least
some of the issues central to the merits of the underlying dispute.
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desires of the parties. Indeed, the exercise of such discretion may
frequently be directly contrary to what the parties desire. Because
of this, one cannot help but wonder whether the consequences of
the Court's Enterprise decision are not likely to change the nature
of labor arbitration as much or more than it would have been changed
if the Supreme Court had instructed the lower courts to engage in
serious review before enforcing an arbitration award.
I think the Court cannot have it both ways. If courts are to be
brought into the arbitration process-and in the federal sphere, this
was a decision made in part by Congress37 and in part by the Supreme
Court in its Lincoln Mills decision 3 -- it is inevitable that they will
have an effect on the nature of that process. The Supreme Court tried
to avoid this, but it was bound to fail. Moreover, it failed in a way
that does discredit to the judicial process, for the Court instructed
the judges that at no point need they accept any responsibility. At
no point is the judge to make certain that the parties did agree to
arbitrate the particular dispute.
I would suggest that a happier solution is to have serious judicial
review of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the particular dis-
pute in a post-arbitration proceeding. This does not mean, of course,
that the court will examine the question de novo. It does mean that
the arbitrator must be required to write a reasoned and unambiguous
opinion. It does mean that the court will review the arbitrator's
award to determine whether it is reasonable in light of the language
and purpose of the collective bargaining agreement and the common
law of the enterprise as revealed in the opinion of the arbitrator.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's approach to judicial review of the promise
to arbitrate reflects its understandable desire to give governmental
support to labor arbitration, and to do so without changing the
nature of arbitration and without bringing into disrepute the judicial
process. The approach, however, is less than fully successful. The
Court in Warrior was perceptive in recognizing that the arbitrator
is better suited to the task of initial, serious decision than is the
court. In Enterprise, however, the Court was not persuasive in sup-
porting its apparent position that arbitration will be helped and.the
courts unharmed by having no serious judicial review after an award.
37. See 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 US.C. § 185 (1958).
38. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.. 448 (1957). But see Bickel &
Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case,
71 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1957).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
HeinOnline -- 37 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 483 1962
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
One can hope that the Supreme Court will re-examine and
modify the extreme position it seems to have advanced in Enterprise.
Perhaps arbitrators ultimately will be required to write reasoned
opinions. If so, language in Enterprise itself may serve as the guiding
principle for lower courts:
[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the
collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own
brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from
many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator's
words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice
but to refuse enforcement of the award. 39
39. 363 U.S. at 597.
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